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We simulate the budget of the main pension institution of the country, the Banco de 
Previsión Social (BPS), from 1995, the year the reform was passed, to 2050, when the new 
system should be mature. We perform several sensitivity analyses to evaluate which are the 
key exogenous variables and parameters determining the financial performance of the BPS 
in the medium to long run. According to our simulations, the budget of the BPS will be 
highly sensitive to the ages of retirement and to the ability and willingness of the institution 
to control the fulfilment of the required conditions to receive a contributory pension. The 
flexibility with which the BPS granted these benefits in the past had significant effects on 
its financial performance, according to these simulations. In recent years, the BPS has 
tightened the controls, with potentially significant effects on both the budget and the 
number of individuals excluded from the contributory programs. We study the contingent 
fiscal liabilities that are associated to the risk that the number of applications to the 
assistance programs grows because of the tougher conditions in the contributory programs. 
We also evaluate some alternatives to reform the non-contributory programs that, among 
other things, would extend their current coverage.  
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1 Introduction 
 
One of the main goals of the reform that introduced savings accounts in the Uruguayan 
pension system was to put the budget of the public pillar on a sustainable path, and to 
reduce the burden it represented on the government and ultimately on the taxpayers. In the 
present paper, we make an attempt to assess whether this goal is being achieved. To this 
end, we simulate an overlapping generations model in the fashion of Auerbach and 
Kotlikoff (1987) calibrated to the Uruguayan conditions and with a particular focus on the 
pension system (Forteza, 2003). We simulate the budget of the main pension institution of 
the country, the Banco de Previsión Social (BPS), from 1995, the year the reform was 
passed, to 2050, when the new system should be mature. We perform several sensitivity 
analyses to evaluate which are the key exogenous variables and parameters determining the 
financial performance of the BPS. The public pension program is also composed of the 
army and police retirement services. The budget of these institutions is several times 
smaller than that of the BPS, but it is still significant since it represents approximately 1.8 
per cent of GDP. We provide a very brief account of its recent performance.  
 
The simulations mentioned above make fairly simple assumptions about the non-
contributory part of the Uruguayan social security system. Until now, this has been a 
relatively minor program. However, preventing poverty among the elderly is one of the 
main goals of public pension systems, and some doubts have recently been raised about the 
ability of the contributory programs to address this issue in Latin American countries (Gill, 
Packard and Yelmo, 2003). Besides, there is some concern in Uruguay that the tightening 
of the conditions to access to the contributory pensions that came with the reform might put 
the assistance program under more pressure. This means that the assistance program might 
have to be redesigned to face these new challenges. We consider several options for reform 
and make an attempt to assess the contingent fiscal liabilities that might be associated to 
them. 
 
After this introduction, the paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, we briefly describe the 
current situation of the public pension programs and old-age poverty in Uruguay, trying to 
put it in a regional perspective. Section 3 contains the results of simulating the overlapping 
generations model to assess fiscal sustainability in the medium to long run. Section 4 is 
devoted to the analysis of the non-contributory programs and the alternatives for reform. 
We present our main conclusions in section 5.  
 
2  Pensions and old-age poverty in Uruguay 
 
A recent study conducted in the World Bank concludes that the reformed pension systems 
in Latin America have not devoted enough attention to the alleviation of poverty among the 
elderly (Gill, Packard and Yelmo, 2003). More often than not, reforming countries have 
settled minimum pensions, but mostly based on a history of previous contributions. Given 
the low coverage of the pension systems in most countries in the region, the argument goes,   4 
this requirement leaves a significant part of the population excluded, constraining the 
ability of the pension systems to prevent and alleviate poverty.  
 
According to the same study, pension reforms in Latin America have not succeeded in their 
attempt at reducing informality and increasing coverage of the pension systems. Reformers 
argued that the new policies would provide incentives for workers to formalize (World 
Bank, 1994). The basic idea was that the old systems had a big implicit labour tax 
component that induced workers to stay in the informal sector. By reducing this implicit 
tax, the reforms would reduce the distortion, and workers would increasingly move towards 
the formal sectors. However, there is no conclusive evidence showing significant progress 
in this front. Gill, Packard and Yelmo (2003) argue that coverage continues being low and 
has not improved much in several reforming countries. Bertranou, Grushka and Rofman 
(2001) show that, in Argentina, the share of the population covered by the pension system 
has decreased after the reform, both in terms of contributors and pensioners. Chile exhibits 
better performance: the share of employed workers that are actively contributing rose 
significantly after the reform and there is some evidence that coverage among the elderly 
has also increased (Arenas de Mesa and Hernández, 2001; Schmidt-Hebbel, 2001).  
 
Poverty among the elderly is also prevalent in several Latin American countries. Gill, 
Packard and Yelmo (2003) note that, in 1998, the incidence of poverty among the elderly 
was larger than in other age groups in six out of the eight countries included in the study 
done by Wodon, Lee and Saens (2002). Therefore, in most Latin American countries, the 
elderly seem to be a vulnerable group in terms of poverty risk.  
 
The current situation of the elderly in Uruguay is quite different from what was described 
above. Like other Latin American countries, Uruguay has not developed a large non-
contributory program, but the contributory programs are larger than in other countries in the 
region. Nowadays, total public expenditure in pensions represents 15 per cent of GDP 
(Ferreira-Coimbra and Forteza, 2004). Besides, the coverage of the pension programs 
among the elderly is large, at least by Latin American standards (table 1). Almost 90 per 
cent of the population aged 65 and above receive a pension, and this record has not changed 
significantly during the last decade. The coverage of recipients is lower and has been 
reducing in the aftermath of the reform for age groups between 55 and 64, but this is not 
necessarily a sign of increasing informality. The data suggests that the drop in the 
percentage of pensioners among these age groups is mostly due to the postponement of 
retirement. As table 1 shows, the sum of contributors and recipients of the pension system 
in these age groups has not changed significantly between 1995, the last year of the pre-
reformed system, and 2000. The decline in the proportion of pensioners aged 55 to 64 
between 1995 and 2000 is countervailed by a similar rise in the proportion of contributors. 
The decline in the share of pensioners in these age groups has apparently been even 
stronger during 2001 and 2002, while the share of contributors continued rising. In these   5 
last two years, however, the decline in pensioners outweighs the increase in contributors, 
probably due to the rise of unemployment and informality during the crisis.
3  
 
Coverage of the pension system is significantly smaller among younger population and 
among active workers than among the elderly, and it has been so for many years. Bucheli 
(2003) reports that approximately two thirds of the employed workers contributed to social 
security in 2002 in Uruguay, a figure that is well below the coverage of recipients 
mentioned above.
4 Significant gaps between the proportion of contributors and of recipients 
of the pension system has also been reported in Argentina, Brazil and Chile (Bertranou, 
2001). These gaps can be partially explained by the non-contributory and the survival 
pensions, but several analysts have pointed out that the gaps are also due to the flexibility 
with which contributory old-age pensions were granted in these countries in the past 
(Camacho, 1997; Forteza, 1999; Bertranou, 2001; Caristo and Forteza, 2003).  
 
Not only is the coverage of the pension system among the active workers smaller than 
among the elderly, but it has also been declining in recent years in Uruguay. Bucheli (2003) 
reports a fall of the rate of coverage of employed workers of about 2.5 points between 1991 
and 2000. She also shows that the fall in the share of employed workers that contributed to 
social security during the nineties is due to the reduction of the proportion of public 
employment in total employment. Given that the proportion of uncovered workers in the 
public sector is close to zero, this change in the structure of employment drives the average 
(public plus private) rate of coverage down. The rate of coverage within each group, i.e. 
public and private employees, did not change during these years. In any case, the reform 
does not seem to have contributed to raise the coverage among active workers.  
 
In Uruguay, unlike in the sample of Latin American countries reported by Wodon, Lee and 
Saens (2002), the incidence of poverty among the aged population is significantly lower 
and has declined faster than in other age groups during the nineties (table 2). In all age 
groups, poverty reduced during the first half of the nineties and rose in recent years, 
following the economic cycle. But the reduction was stronger and the rise less pronounced 
among the elderly than among other age groups.
5  
 
The decrease in old age poverty during the nineties coincides with the rise in the purchasing 
power of pensions that took place in this decade (table 3). The significant decline in the 
                                                 
3 The 2001-2002 figures should be taken with caution for two reasons: a) there was a change in the 
methodology of the survey in 2001, b) these years are quite atypical because of the huge crisis Uruguay was 
passing through.  
4 Comparisons between coverage among the employed and the elderly should be done with caution, for these 
indexes are not directly comparable. Unlike the coverage rate of the elderly, the index of coverage among the 
employed does not count all the population in the denominator and is not refered to an specific age group. The 
proportion of the young population that is contributing to the pension system must be significantly smaller 
than two thirds, and the gap between contributors and beneficiaries must be larger than what the above 
mentioned figures indicate. Therefore, even though these indexes can only provide a very rough 
approximation to the actual gap between contributors and beneficiaries, it seems enough to make the point 
that a significant gap exists.  
5 Despite of the low incidence of poverty among elderly people, poor old women, specially widows without 
children, constitute one of the most vulnerable social groups according to World Bank (2001).   6 
rates of inflation during the first half of the nineties caused a rise in the purchasing power 
of pensions, due to the lagged-indexation rules that were used to adjust pensions. Given the 
comparatively wide coverage of the pension system among the elderly, the rise in the 
purchasing power of pensions seem to have had a significant impact on poverty alleviation 
in this age groups. Gradin and Rossi (2001) show that pensions contributed to ameliorate 
the polarization of labour income that occurred in the country between 1989 and 1997. 
 
3  The budget of the Banco de Previsión Social (BPS) 
 
As the pensions became increasingly generous during the nineties, the expenditure of the 
public pension programs rose at a very significant pace (table 4). The BPS is by far the 
biggest of the three programs and the one that contributed most to the rise of public 
spending in pensions, but it was the army retirement service the one that grew at a highest 
rate during this period. Altogether, these programs represent today roughly one half of total 
government expenditure.  
 
The revenues of the BPS also grew at a higher rate than GDP during most of the nineties. 
Yet, revenues could not keep the pace with spending and the government had to support the 
BPS with increasing amounts of financial assistance (table 5). The reform of the pension 
program that began in 1996 did not immediately curb these expansionary trends, and it was 
not supposed to do it, given the gradualism that characterizes the Uruguayan reform 
process. Furthermore, the financial assistance required by the BPS was expected to increase 
at the inception of the reform (see box 1 for a brief description of the reform). 
 
In recent years, the recession hit the BPS and its performance was much worst than it could 
be expected in normal conditions. These abnormal macroeconomic environment makes it 
difficult the assessment of the performance of the reformed system. It is not easy to tell 
whether and to what extent the substantive increase in the financial assistance required by 
the BPS in recent years is a temporary phenomenon due to the recession or is a sign that 
something went wrong with the reform and should be fixed. In this section, we present 
some simulation results that abstract from the short run macroeconomic fluctuations. The 
aim is to understand the more permanent and substantive trends that are ultimately crucial 
for the intertemporal sustainability of the government budget. In the appendix, we do a 
rough and highly tentative comparison between actual and simulated performance in recent 
years, trying to disentangle the temporary from the more permanent and substantive trends.    7 
 
 
Box 1: The reform of the Uruguayan pension system (law 16.713) 
 
In 1995, the Uruguayan parliament passed the bill for the reform of the main
pensions program of the country. By that time, this program served almost ninety
per cent of all the pensions paid in Uruguay (Ferreira and Forteza, 2004). Since
1967, this program had been ruled by a public and autonomous-from-the-
government body called the Banco de Previsión Social (BPS). The pre-reform
program had defined benefits and a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) financial regime.  
 
The reform initiated in 1995 introduced a savings account pillar and modified key
parameters of the  PAYG pillar. As a general rule, affiliates with wages below a
threshold continue  being served exclusively by the public-PAYG pillar, unless they
explicitly opt for sending half of their personal contributions to a savings account.
Until now, most workers in this situation made this option and are currently
contributing to both pillars by halves. Affiliates with higher wages are obliged to
make personal contributions to both pillars. Employers' contributions go exclusively
to the public-PAYG pillar. Accordingly, low-wage workers who did not opt for the
savings accounts receive their full pension from the BPS, while other workers'
pensions are financed by both the BPS and the funds accumulated in their savings
accounts. According to estimations made in the BPS (Camacho, 1997), the public
pillar will still be paying roughly three quarters of the pensions of this mixed
program when the reformed system reaches maturity. 
 
The public-PAYG pillar was reformed in several important aspects. As a general
rule, the accessibility conditions were tightened, both on paper and in practice. The
required minimum age for women to receive a contributory pension was raised from
55 to 60 years, and the minimum number of years of effective contributions required
to receive the pension was raised from 30 to 35 for both women and men. The
administration of the system was significantly improved, implying, among other
things, that the accessibility conditions are currently better controlled for. In turn,
the formulae used to compute the pension were changed. Minimum and maximum
pensions paid by the public pillar were raised. The replacement rate was made more
sensitive to the retirement age and the years of contributions, i.e. it was reduced for
workers retiring with the minimum required age and years of contributions and
raised for workers who decide to retire later. Finally, the number of years of
contributions considered to compute the initial pension was raised. Before the
reform, the so-called "basic pension wage" (the figure that multiplies the
replacement rate to produce the initial pension) was the average of the wages on
which the last three years of contributions were done. After the reform, the formula
takes into account the last ten years of contributions and the twenty years of highest
contributions. With this change, the reformers aimed at reducing the incentives to
underreport earnings during most of the working life and to over report earnings
during the last three years prior to retirement.    8 
3.1 Methodology 
 
We simulated the public pillar of the Uruguayan pension system using the MISS program 
(Modelo Informático de la Seguridad Social, Forteza, 2002). MISS is an overlapping 
generations model programmed in GAMS. It is a variant of the Auerbach-Kotlikoff 
multigenerations model (Auerbach and Kotlikoff, 1987) adapted and calibrated to the 
Uruguayan conditions. These models are mainly used to perform sensitivity analysis, i.e. to 
study the impact of exogenous shocks and policy changes on the endogenous variables. 
Like most users of these tools, we do not aim at forecasting. 
 
We present the simulated budget of the BPS between 1995 and 2050. The initial year is the 
moment in which the reform that introduced a mixed system was passed and the final year 
was chosen to capture the maturity of the reformed system (the new steady state). Even 
though the series are computed on an annual basis, the current version of the model is not 
designed to represent short-run or cyclical fluctuations. It is rather meant to represent the 
medium to long run trends.  
 
In order to reproduce some basic Uruguayan figures, we calibrated several key parameters. 
Some of these parameters were kept invariant through all the simulations. In this group, life 
expectancies and the rate of growth of the population are among the most important. We 
calibrated these demographic variables to reproduce the existing forecasts for the 
Uruguayan population, introducing in the model gender and generational specific life 
expectancies and rates of growth of the population.  
 
Other parameters and exogenous variables were initially set at a certain level, based mostly 
on historical performance, to define a base scenario, and later modified to study the impact 
on the path of the endogenous variables.
6 These parameters and exogenous variables 
include the real interest rate, the rate of growth of real wages (labour productivity), the 
actual and the declared individual labour histories, the minimum age for retirement, the 
replacement rates and the benefits actually granted to permanent evaders.
7  
 
The analysed scenarios are summarized in table 6. The base scenario is described first 
(scenario 1) and the following ones are variants designed to study the impact of changes in 
the exogenous variables and parameters. The differences between the base and the 
following scenarios are highlighted in bold. 
 
                                                 
6 This study was not designed to analyse the impact of the reform on the pension system, but rather to analyse 
the impact of several variables and parameters on the working of the reformed system. In order to assess the 
impact of the reform, a counterfactual should be provided, i.e. the path of the endogenous variables in a non-
reformed system should be evaluated. The assessment would be based on a comparison of the simulated paths 
with and without reform. For an analysis on those lines, see Forteza 1999; Caristo and Forteza, 2003; among 
others. In the present paper, the base scenario plays the role of a benchmark case against which other 
scenarios are compared.    
7  The MISS model distinguishes between actual and declared labour histories to represent evasion. It also 
considers the possibility that the BPS does not abide by the law and grant contributory pensions to individuals 
who do not fulfil the legally required conditions.   9 
The scenarios 2 and 3 differ from the base scenario only in the interest rate. The scenarios 4 
and 5 differ from the base scenario in the assumed rate of growth of the real wage. In these 
four scenarios, we considered values for the interest rate and the rate of growth of wages 
above and below those in the base scenario.  
 
The following two scenarios were designed to analyse the impact of changes in the 
behaviour of individuals in terms of actual and reported labour histories. In the scenarios 6 
and 7, individuals raise their actual and reported working time in one and two years, 
respectively, compared to the base scenario. Accordingly, the age at which they receive the 
pension for the first time rises by one and two years, respectively, compared to the base 
values, which were computed from data reported before the reform.
8 We did not consider a 
scenario in which individuals work less and the age of retirement is reduced with respect to 
the base scenario, because this event does not look likely. In fact, as we have already 
mentioned, there is some evidence that the mean age of retirement could be increasing 
(table 1). Besides, this is not surprising in the light of the incentives introduced in the law 
of reform for later retirement. The most direct measure oriented to raising retirement ages 
was the increase in the required minimum age for women to receive a contributory old-age 
pension. However, minimum retirement ages were scheduled to rise gradually following a 
timetable that only finished in 2003, and hence it does not seem to explain much of the 
recent rise in the mean age of retirement. Other policy measures that are most likely 
impacting on the mean ages for retirement are the change of the formula to compute the 
replacement rate, the increase in the minimum number of years of contributions required to 
receive a pension and the improved monitoring of the conditions that candidates must fulfil 
to get the pension (see box 1). 
 
Scenarios 8 and 9 consider an increase in the minimum retirement age, from the current 60 
years to 63 and 65, respectively. Other assumptions are those of the base scenario. We 
estimated first the impact that these changes in the minimum retirement age could have on 
average ages of retirement, and then simulated the model with the new average retirement 
ages. For the first step, we considered the number of new pensioners of different ages in 
1994.
9 We assumed that the increased minimum age would induce those who were retiring 
younger to do it at the new minimum age, and that other workers would not change their 
retirement behaviour. Proceeding in this way, we tried to isolate the effect of the change in 
the required age for retirement from other innovations of the pension policy, but it should 
be clear that the change of this parameter interacts with other aspects of the reform. Among 
other things, the reformulation of the replacement rates and the increase of the minimum 
number of years of contributions required for a pension are likely to induce later retirement, 
independently of the increased minimum age. If this is so, the impact of a given increase in 
the minimum age for retirement might be smaller than what our computations, that 
disregard these interactions, suggest. For this reason, we consider this estimation in 
particular as an upper bound to the real impact of this policy change. 
                                                 
8 The decisions to work and to declare the activity to the BPS and the resulting age for retirement should 
ideally be treated as endogenous variables. However, and even though the MISS allows to endogenize these 
variables, we do not feel confident with the calibration of the model in this respect in the current version. 
Therefore, we prefered to keep them exogenous. 
9 This is the same information used to compute average retirement ages before the reform (BPS, 1995). 
Unfortunately, there is no such information for recent years.    10 
 
Scenarios 10 and 11 are designed to analyze the impact of reducing the rates of 
replacement. We assumed that these rates are reduced by 2 and 4 percentage points, 
respectively, from 2005 onwards. In these simulations, the workers' decisions to work, 
retire and evade were kept constant. In the real world, reductions in the rates of replacement 
would probably induce workers to modify these decisions. However, it is not easy to tell by 
how much would workers raise evasion or even whether they would retire earlier or later 
and work more or less, if the rates of replacement decreased. We decided then to adopt the 
neutral assumption that these variables remain constant. 
 
Finally, scenario 12 was designed to study the impact of changes in evasion. The focus is 
on a group of individuals who managed to get a contributory pension without having 
contributed.
10 In the base scenario, the assumption is that from 1995 onwards the BPS does 
not grant this benefit to new applicants who do not fulfil the required conditions. 
Individuals in this group are assumed to stay out of the contributory system: they keep on 
evading, but they no longer receive the contributory pension. They get instead a non-
contributory-old-age pension when they are 70 years old. The rationale for this assumption 
is that, as all observers have pointed out, the controls have been tightened up during the 
nineties and there is today almost no room for getting a contributory pension without 
having contributed. Nevertheless, in scenario 12 we assumed that these practices continue 
in place in order to assess the contribution of the tightening of controls on the budget of the 
BPS.  
 
The variables used to analyse the budget of the BPS reproduce the current accounting 
conventions. In order to interpret the numbers that follow, it is crucial to notice that the 
central government provides financial assistance to feel the gap between the own resources 
and the expenditure of the BPS. This financial assistance generates no debt and so the BPS 
does not pay interests. The central government financial assistance could be interpreted as 
the deficit of the BPS, but this would be just a primary deficit.  
3.2 Results 
 
In the base scenario, the central government financial assistance paid to the BPS rises in 
about 0.6 percentage points of GDP during the first years of the reform (table 7). This 
“transition deficit” is the result of the different speed with which contributions and benefits 
in the public pay-as-you-go (PAYG) pillar shrink during the transition. The BPS already 
starts losing contributions at the inception of the reform, while its obligations do not 
significantly reduce until generations that receive part of their pension from the private 
fully-funded pillar start retiring. Approximately ten years after the beginning of the reform, 
the deficit of the BPS falls below the 1995 level, and from then on it continues falling. In 
the long run, the deficit of the BPS falls from 3.1 per cent of GDP in 1995 to 0.6 per cent of 
GDP in 2050.
11  
                                                 
10  On this, see Camacho, 1997, Bertranou, 2001, Forteza, 2003, among others.  
11 It is worth mentioning once more that the model does not reproduce short-run economic fluctuations, and 
hence we did not aim at calibrating it to simulate the recent economic cycle. The figures in table 7 should be 
read as the outcomes of the system in highly standardized conditions, and become meaningful in the context   11 
 
We did not find significant effects of the interest rate on the budget of the BPS (table 8, 
scenarios 2 and 3). It is key for this result the practice of not recording any debt of the 
institution. Obviously, the impact that the financial assistance of the government to the BPS 
has on public debt does crucially depend on the interest rate.
12  
 
The rate of growth of real wages did not have significant impact on the simulated budget of 
the BPS as percentage of GDP (table 8, scenarios 4 and 5). The fact that we measure these 
variables in per cent of GDP is crucial to interpret this result. What is actually occurring in 
this simulation is that the three involved variables (the estimated contributions, expenditure 
of the BPS, and GDP) rise almost in the same proportion with an increase of the rate of 
growth of wages.
13 Hence, the ratios do not change. The rate of growth of real wages is 
positively correlated with GDP growth in the model, because both are ultimately 
determined by the rate of growth of productivity. Contributions naturally depend on real 
wages, since these are payroll taxes. Part of the own resources of the BPS come from the 
value added tax, which is directly correlated to GDP. Finally, benefits paid are fully 
indexed to wages in Uruguay. In sum, the revenues and the expenditure of the BPS, as well 
as GDP, are scaled up and down according to the rate of growth of productivity and real 
wages. 
 
As it could be expected, the budget of the BPS depends on the retirement ages (table 8, 
scenarios 6 and 7). On average, each year of delay of the retirement decision reduces the 
financial assistance in about 0.2 percentage points of GDP (average in the whole period of 
estimation 1996-2050). If the decisions to postpone retirement were taken at the inception 
of the reform and from then onwards, the maximum reduction in the assistance would take 
place in the second decade of this century, reaching in that moment approximately 0.3 
percentage points of GDP (per year of delayed retirement).  
 
Later retirement reduces the financial assistance required by the BPS basically because it 
reduces the institution's expenditure. When workers retire later, they receive larger 
pensions, but during less years. Obviously, the former raises and the latter reduces the 
expenditure of the BPS. According to our simulations, in the aggregate the former 
outweighs the latter, at least for one or two years of postponement of retirement. The 
balance could of course be different for individual cases. There is also some effect going 
through revenues, but this is of a smaller order of magnitude. 
 
As we have already mentioned, we can only get very imprecise estimations of the impact of 
raising the minimum retirement age because of both the likely interactions with other 
policies and the lack of updated information on the retirement behaviour of the population 
                                                                                                                                                     
of the sensitivity analysis that follows. Nevertheless, we provide a rough comparison between what happened 
in recent years and the results of the simulations in the appendix. 
12 Furthermore, if the interest rate is larger than the rate of growth of GDP (which is the normal case), the 
public debt dynamics is unstable, unless the government has explicit fiscal rules designed to stabilize it. There 
is nothing like that in Uruguay nor in most countries. 
13 To save space, we only included in the tables the financial assistance to the BPS. Other series are available 
upon request (including contributions, general taxes affected to the BPS, contributory and non-contributory 
pensions, benefits paid to active workers and administrative expenditure).    12 
attended by the BPS. With these qualifications, we found that setting the minimum age for 
retirement in 63 years would induce average retirement ages of 65 for males and 64 for 
females. If the minimum were raised further to 65, the averages would be 66 for males and 
65 for females (table 6, scenarios 8 and 9). In other words, raising the minimum in three 
(five) years would cause an increase in the average retirement age of about one (two) year 
for males and four (five) years for females. The financial assistance required by the BPS 
could be reduced by almost 0.25 percentage points of GDP if the minimum retirement age 
were risen to 63, and by approximately 0.50 if it were risen to 65 (both figures are averages 
of the period 1996-2050). The main channel is through reduced expenditure.  
 
The simulated financial assistance to the BPS declined in the scenarios with reduced rates 
of replacement more than in the base scenario (table 8, scenarios 10 and 11). The BPS 
could reduce its average deficit over the period 2005-2050 by 0.17 and 0.34 percentage 
points of GDP, if the replacement rates were reduced by 2 and 4 percentage points, 
respectively. In the long run, the savings to the BPS would be in the order of 0.20 and 0.40 
points of GDP, respectively.  
 
The results in scenario 12 highlight the importance of the controls of the BPS over who 
receive the contributory pensions. According to these simulations, the financial assistance 
required by the BPS would continue growing, reaching figures as large as 5 percentage 
points of GDP in some years, if the old flexibility for granting pensions continued 
unchanged despite of the reform initiated in 1995. This is not to say that this is a likely 
scenario, but just to show that the expected improvement on the budget of the BPS in our 
simulations hinges on the assumed tightening of the procedures to grant the pensions. We 
have already raised this point in previous studies (Forteza, 1999, Caristo and Forteza, 
2003). Forteza (1999) also shows that the improvement in the budget of the BPS projected 
by Camacho (1997) is mostly due to this same assumption.  
 
4  Options to reform the non-contributory-old-age 
pensions program 
 
As we have already discussed, the Uruguayan pension system has broad coverage and the 
incidence of poverty is low among the aged population in Uruguay today, but several 
analysts fear that these conditions might deteriorate in the future. The conditions that 
workers must fulfil to be entitled to a contributory pension have been tightened in recent 
years, both de jure and de facto. As to the formal norms, the minimum number of years of 
contributions required to receive a pension in the main ordinary program was raised from 
30 to 35, and the minimum retirement age for women was raised from 55 to 60 (Law 
16.713 of reform of the main pension program passed through in 1995). As to the 
implementation or de facto policy, several observers have claimed that during the nineties 
the Banco de Previsión Social (BPS, main pension institution in the country) adopted more 
demanding and close-to-the-norms procedures to grant the contributory pensions,   13 
abandoning the former highly flexible practices (Saldain, 1995; Forteza, 2003; Murro, 
2003, personal communication; among others).
14 
 
If these fears are well founded, poverty and social exclusion among the elderly could 
become an issue in Uruguay in the next years, and the government might feel the necessity 
to reform the non-contributory programs to address these problems. One of the first 
questions that arise then is whether the government would be able to afford such a reform 
or, put differently, which are the contingent fiscal liabilities associated to the risk of 
increasing social exclusion among the elderly? The aim of this section of the paper is to 
provide some estimations of the fiscal cost of reforming the non-contributory pension 
programs to face these new challenges.  
 
After this introduction, we briefly describe first the non-contributory-old-age program of 
the BPS. Then, we discuss some options for reform and some contingent claims on the non-
contributory program that could stem from the failure of the contributory program to 
provide effective coverage to all the legally covered population. Some words of warning 
are in order though, before we proceed. The computations we provide are meant to convey 
a sense of the order of magnitude of the contingent fiscal liabilities involved. We cannot 
expect to compute any precise cost of a program that has not yet been designed, and to face 
a social problem that has not yet arisen. The aim is rather to provide some estimations that 
should help to assess fiscal sustainability in the medium to long run, taking into account the 
often mentioned contingent liabilities that are associated to the risk of declining coverage of 
the pension programs among the elderly. 
 
4.1  The non-contributory-old-age pension program of the BPS 
 
The old-age pension program of the Banco de Previsión Social is a means-tested-non-
contributory benefit. The target population is composed of persons aged 70 and above 
whose personal earnings do not reach a certain threshold or target pension and do not have 
close relatives who could support them. The benefit is the difference between the target 
pension and the current earnings of the candidate.
15 Box 2 summarizes the main 
characteristics of the program. 
 
 
                                                 
14 Murro and Saldain are former members of the board of the Banco de Previsión Social, the former in 
representation of the workers and the latter being the president of the institution when the reform began and 
one of the writters of the reform law. 
15 Many assistance programs in the world provide supplementary earnings, rather than a flat amount. This is 
the case, for instance, of the Supplemental Security Income program, in the United States, the old-person´s 
pension within the State Earnings - Related Pension Scheme in the United Kingdom or the old-age allowances 
in France.   14 
Box 2.  The non-contributory-old-age pensions program of the Banco de Previsión Social 
Target population  •  The elderly. 
Eligibility conditions  •  Being 70 years old or more. 
•  Having individual earnings lower than the target pension. 
•  Not having direct relatives with economic capacity to support 
them with a “pensión alimenticia” (alimony). Members of the 
applicant’s family who live with him/her must provide a 
“pensión alimenticia”, if they earn 2 or more minimum salaries 
and are single, or earn 3 or more minimum salaries per capita 
and are married. Members of the applicant’s family who do not 
live with him/her must provide a “pensión alimenticia”, if their 
individual earnings are equal to or larger than 5 minimum 
salaries. 
•  Living in Uruguay. 
Benefit  •  The individual pension is the difference between the target 
pension and other earnings of the pensioner. The target pension 
amounts to approximately 73 dollars per month today (March, 
2004), and is periodically adjusted with the average wage 
index.
16 
Source: Adapted from Ferreira-Coimbra and Forteza, 2004. 
 
 
This is a small program, both in terms of the number of recipients and in terms of the 
budget of the BPS, but individual benefits are comparatively generous (tables 9 and 10). 
Expenditure in this program is in the order of 0.2 per cent of GDP.
17 In recent years (1995 
to 2002), the target pension has represented about 31 per cent of per capita GDP, which is 
basically equal to the poverty line that the Instituto Nacional de Estadística computes. 
Hence the benefit is enough to get recipients out of poverty. Bertranou, Solorio and Van 
Ginneken (2002) compare non-contributory pensions in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa 
Rica and Uruguay, and conclude that Uruguay's pension is the most generous one.  
 
Our computations from the household survey show that there is a significant number of 
people aged 70 or more who do not receive the pension, even though their declared total 
earnings are below the old-age target pension. For 2002, we estimate this figure to be 
somewhere in between 21.1 and 22.4 thousands, while the number of recipients of the old-
age pensions program was 18.1 thousands in the same year (table A5). Some of them might 
not be entitled to the pension because they have relatives who support them, but others 
might not be receiving the benefit because of a failure of the program to reach all the target 
population. According to the norms, persons whose earnings are large enough are obliged 
                                                 
16  Due to the abailability of information, most of the computations in this paper are based on data from 2002. 
It should be noticed that several figures can change drastically in this period when measured in dollar terms, 
because of the devaluation of the domestic currency that took place that year. The target pension in January 
2002 was 135 dollars. 
17 The total expenditure in non-contributory old-age and disability pensions amounts to approximately 0.6 per 
cent of GDP.    15 
to give their old-age-poor relatives an alimony called pensión alimenticia, and the elderly 
receiving this transfer are not eligible for the non-contributory-old-age pension (see box 2). 
The survey asks whether the person is receiving transfers from his/her family or other 
households. The proportion of affirmative answers to this question among old people 
earning less than the old-age pension is extremely low (around 3 per cent, table A5), 
suggesting that most of them are not receiving the benefit even though they have the right 
to receive it. However, on the other hand, no less than 86 per cent of the people aged 70 or 
more whose own earnings are below the old-age pension live in households with per capita 
income high enough to make the family transfer mandatory, rendering them not eligible for 
the pension. These contradictory observations could respond to the fact that most of these 
families do support their old members without providing them a formal pensión 
alimenticia, and hence the corresponding question in the survey fails to capture these in-
kind transfers. If this conclusion were correct, there would not be a significant number of 
potential recipients who are not receiving the pension in this moment. No significant 
contingent claims to the government could arise from this source, at least not if the 
managers of the program could prove that these potential applicants have relatives who can 




We simulated the coverage and cost of several options to reform the current non-
contributory pension program for the elderly. To do this, we combined data provided by the 
BPS on the aggregates of the current program, and micro data on individual incomes from 
the Uruguayan Household Survey (ECH) carried out by the Instituto Nacional de 
Estadística of Uruguay (INE). In order to provide an "anchor" to our simulations, we began 
by replicating the aggregates the BPS reports for the current program with the micro data in 
the household survey. A basic assumption in this replication is that the income reported to 
the household survey and to the BPS are the same, save for an unbiased error. This is a 
strong assumption, given that the incentives to underreport income are much higher in the 
case of the BPS. Unfortunately, lacking micro data from the BPS, this is the best we can do 
today.  
 
The information in the ECH does not allow to directly identify the recipients of the non-
contributory-old-age program of the BPS, because these benefits are merged in the survey 
with survival pensions and some pensions from other sources. Nevertheless, knowing the 
conditions that the recipients should fulfil to be eligible for the assistance pension of the 
BPS plus the earnings they should have once they receive this benefit, we split these two 
different pensions for each individual (see the methodological appendix for the details). We 
could thus identify in the ECH the group of individuals that, according to this source of 
information, are currently beneficiaries of the old-age assistance program. This analysis 
allowed us to determine the average supplementary pension these individuals should 
currently be receiving and compare it with the data from the BPS. In addition to this, we 
calculated the number of people who are currently kept out from the Uruguayan old–age 
pension scheme, despite of having very low earnings, and outlined their most salient 
features in an attempt to understand the reasons for their exclusion.   16 
 
Then we proceeded to estimate the impact of several reforms, keeping the assumption on 
unbiased reports. In these estimations, we also assumed that individuals do not actively 
respond to the reforms changing their actual or declared behaviour. More specifically, we 
assumed that the individual reports of both non-pension earnings and composition of 
families do not change with the simulated reforms. In this sense, our estimations should be 
considered as just accounting computations; there is no economics in them. This 
assumption could be considered as optimistic from the fiscal point of view, since all the 
evaluated reforms provide more generous accessibility conditions and/or benefits, raising 
the incentives for misreporting or actual change in behaviour (working less, changing the 
composition of the family, etc.). Because of this type of problems, we finish this section of 
the paper simulating a flat universal pension scheme. By their very nature, the coverage and 
cost of this type of programs do not depend on individual reports and are thus basically free 
of the above-mentioned problems. 
 
We considered several reform options concerning accession requirements and pension 
values and determined their effects on the cost of the program, the number of beneficiaries 
and the amount of the average pension.  We appraised first the impact of reducing from 70 
to 65 the minimum age to be eligible for the non-contributory-old-age pension. We 
considered two scenarios for this estimation. In the first one, the only change with respect 
to the current situation is the reduction in the minimum age for eligibility. In the second 
scenario, we assumed that the number of workers covered by the contributory programs is 
significantly reduced due to the recent tightening in the accessibility conditions for 
eligibility. The new excluded are assumed to be poor and eligible for the assistance 
program. In order to give a regional perspective, we also compared the current Uruguayan 
non-contributory-old-age program with similar assistance programs in Chile and Costa 
Rica, and estimated the number of recipients and total cost of implementing those programs 
in Uruguay. The program Uruguay has today and the options for reform considered above 
are all means-tested. Given the difficulties in implementing this type of programs, we also 
simulated a universal flat program, with two values for the benefit.  
4.3 Results 
4.3.1 Extending the scope of the non-contributory-old-age pensions 
program 
 
The central trade union PIT-CNT has recently proposed a reform of the old-age pensions 
program. In this proposal, the benefit is maintained in its current terms, but the eligibility 
conditions are modified. On one hand, the minimum age is reduced from 70 to 65 years old. 
On the other hand, the minimum earnings which make individuals legally responsible to 
support their elder direct relatives, providing alimony, is raised to 24 unidades reajustables 
(unit of account indexed to the average salary). This amount represents about 2.3 times the   17 
existing threshold (for the case of single relatives).
18 Hence, this reform should basically 
expand the coverage of the current program, providing the same benefit per capita.  
 
We estimated the impact of a reform on these lines, focusing on the reduction in the age for 
eligibility.
19 We also estimated the effects of a significant drop in the rate of coverage of 
the contributory pension programs among the population aged 65 and above, assuming that 
the workers who lose the right to receive a contributory pension are poor and eligible for 
the non-contributory pension (table 12).  
 
The expenditure of the BPS in the non-contributory-old-age program must be increased by 
47 per cent with respect to the current levels to meet the needs of a program covering poor 
people aged 65 and above. The number of recipients would rise 56 per cent. If, on top of 
that, the number of workers that fulfil the requirements for a contributory pension dropped 
by 10 per cent due to the above mentioned recent tightening of the conditions to access to 
the benefit, and the newly excluded were poor and eligible for the non-contributory 
program, the expenditure of the BPS in this program would rise by 121 per cent. The 
number of recipients would rise by 115 per cent. 
 
A rise of any program by 121 per cent is a very significant increase, indeed. But the fiscal 
impact of this change is not that big, considering the size of the initial program. The 
expenditure in the program would rise in this scenario in the order of 25 million dollars, 
were this numbers computed for 2002. This is an increase of about 0.2 per cent of GDP or 
0.7 per cent of total public expenditure. By themselves, these numbers are not likely to risk 
the sustainability of the government budget. Furthermore, a scenario with a 10 per cent 
drop in the total number of contributory pensioners, all of them among the poorest workers, 
is very pessimistic and not very likely. Therefore, the provision the government should 
make to face these contingent fiscal liabilities do not seem to reach an order of magnitude 
that could destabilize the budget, even in a very pessimistic scenario. Some words of 
caution are in order, though. We assumed that this program is efficiently managed, in the 
specific sense that the underreporting of earnings in the program will not be substantially 
larger than in the household survey. The cost of the program could be much larger if this 
assumption proved false. We will come back to this issue below. 
4.3.2  Implementing in Uruguay the programs of Chile and Costa Rica 
 
Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay have means-tested non-contributory-old-age programs. The 
Uruguayan norms differ from the other two in that the individual pension is computed as 
the difference between the target pension and current declared earnings. Chile and Costa 
Rica in turn grant a flat pension to all elected candidates. The Uruguayan non-contributory-
old-age program has a higher target pension than similar programs in Chile (PASIS) and 
Costa Rica (RNC). Both in terms of current dollars and as a percentage of per capita GDP, 
                                                 
18 The PIT-CNT estimates in 2.5 members the average size of the households in which individuals aged 65 
and above live. The proposed threshold results from multiplying this family size by the poverty line. 
19 We could not assess the impact of changing the conditions refered to family earnings, because of limitations 
of the available data. In any case, it is not clear that the BPS can actually impose such conditions.   18 
the Uruguayan pension is substantially larger than its counterparts (table 10). The access 
conditions also differ. The Uruguayan program is more restrictive in terms of the minimum 
age (70 years in Uruguay and 65 in the other two countries), and less restrictive in terms of 
the maximum earnings of eligible candidates (91 dollars in Uruguay, 58 dollars in Chile 
and 51 dollars in Costa Rica; 2002 figures). Other access conditions are more difficult to 
assess and compare. Unlike in Uruguay, there is no explicit mandate or general rule for 
families of poor elderly to support them in Chile and Costa Rica, but both countries 
perform individual socio-economic studies, which presumably determine whether the 
candidates have close relatives able to support them. Finally, governments in Chile and 
Costa Rica settle the maximum amount they are willing to spend on these programs, and 
give pensions to the better ranked candidates until this amount is reached (Bertranou, 
Solorio and Van Ginneken, 2002). There is nothing similar in Uruguay. 
  
According to our estimations, the Uruguayan government would save money if it 
substituted either a Chilean like or a Costa Rican like program for the current Uruguayan 
non-contributory-old-age pension program (table 11).  The pension in these new schemes 
would be lower than in the current Uruguayan program. The covered population would 
decrease in the Chilean like program, reinforcing the savings from the lower pension, and 
rise in the Costa Rican one, but not enough to compensate for the reduction in the per capita 
benefit. Implementing the Chilean program in Uruguay would drastically reduce 
government expenditure, despite of the lower minimum age, basically because of the low 
income per capita of the household above which the person is non-eligible for a pension. 
This condition would leave most of the current recipients of the Uruguayan old-age pension 
program out of it. The implementation of a Costa Rican like program in Uruguay would 
increase the number of recipients substantially, but the Costa Rican pension is so low 
compared to the Uruguayan one that total expenditure would even decrease.   
 
It should be mentioned that in this exercise of mimicking the Chilean and Costa Rican non-
contributory programs in Uruguay, we assumed the pension is granted to all candidates 
fulfilling the conditions. This means that we did not reproduce those programs in setting a 
maximum total expenditure and granting benefits only to the better-ranked candidates. In 
this sense, our estimation must be considered as an upper bound to the size of these types of 
non-contributory programs in Uruguay. It must be emphasized, though, that we assumed 
for these computations that all the norms of the programs are actually enforced and, in 
particular, that the administrator of the program is able to exclude applicants whose 
household income is above the threshold. This was a key condition in determining the very 
small size that a hypothetical Chilean like program would have in Uruguay. In practice, it is 
doubtful that the Uruguayan bureaucracy can actually do that. 
4.3.3  A lump-sum universal pension 
 
The options for reform of the non-contributory-old-age pension program we have analysed 
so far condition eligibility to earnings, and as such assume there is some means testing. 
This type of conditionality is prevalent among real world programs that are primarily aimed 
at alleviating poverty, but it is also possible to alleviate poverty giving a flat universal 
transfer, and there are some programs in the world that do this (for an example, see box 1 in   19 
World Bank, 2003). The rationale for conditionality and means testing is quite obvious: 
reduce costs and give the benefit to those who really need it. But the difficulties that are 
associated to this type of programs are also significant: large administrative costs, 
corruption, distortions of incentives to save, and social stigma (see World Bank, 2003; 
Willmore, 2001 a and b). Once these real world problems are taken into account, the 
relative virtues of means-tested vis-à-vis universal assistance programs become more 
balanced.  
 
Assessing the Uruguayan non-contributory-old-age program is beyond the scope of this 
paper, but given the universal problems with this type of programs and some local 
evidence, we should not give for granted that the BPS will be able to manage a highly 
selective and considerably expanded program for poverty alleviation, like the ones we 
simulated before, with reasonable degrees of efficiency. Uruguay does not have a 
significant income tax, so that the tax office has not developed the specific capabilities that 
are involved in the report of earnings. The BPS does have some experience with means 
testing and related conditionality. However, casual observation and some aggregate figures 
of the system suggest that the institution might be experiencing difficulties in getting 
truthful reports of earnings. In recent years, the average pension actually paid has been 
more than 90 per cent of the target pension, which looks pretty high for a program that pays 
only the gap between the target and current income. We computed the average pension the 
BPS should pay, assuming the earnings reported to the household survey are correct, and 
got only 50 per cent of the target pension. Therefore, the assumption implicit in our 
previous estimations that the BPS pays exactly the difference between the target pension 
and the actual current earnings of recipients seems too optimistic.
20 We estimated then the 
cost of a universal program. 
 
The Achilles’ heel of a universal flat pension is its fiscal cost. The World Bank (2003) 
estimated the fiscal cost of giving a universal flat pension equivalent to the minimum wage 
to all individuals aged 65 and above in several Latin American countries. For the case of 
Uruguay, the cost of this program would represent now about two per cent of GDP, 
reaching almost four per cent of GDP by 2050. It could be argued that the minimum wage 
is very low in Uruguay, so we estimated the fiscal cost of giving the current non-
contributory-old-age pension as a universal benefit to all individuals aged 65 and above.
21 
This program would cost today almost four per cent of GDP, which represents roughly 
twenty times the size of the program that the BPS currently has in place. The number of 
recipients would rise by more than twenty times (see table 12).  
 
                                                 
20 The data suggests that many potential candidates abstain from applying to the assistance pension when their 
families can support them, despite of the limited capacity of the BPS to effectively control that this condition 
is actually fulfilled (see section 4.3.3 on this). Self-control seems to be relatively effective to produce reliable 
reports in this respect. But many of those who apply to the benefit significantly under report their actual 
earnings. A similar pattern seems to be present in the family allowances program (Bucheli, personal 
communication). It would be useful to further explore this hypothesis, conducting surveys among both the 
target population and the staff of the BPS engaged in these programs. 
21 As we already noticed, this amount has been almost equal to the INE's poverty line in recent years, which 
adds another reason to consider it.   20 
5 Conclusions 
 
According to the simulations presented in this paper and in almost all the scenarios 
analysed, the financial assistance required by the BPS should currently be on a decreasing 
trend. Only when we assumed that the institution continues granting pensions to people 
who do not fulfil the conditions legally required we got a diverging path, but this scenario 
looks unlikely. This is not enough to say that the government budget is sustainable, since 
the BPS is only part of the government, but it does show that one of the most challenging 
and menacing components of the government budget in the first half of the nineties should 
now be under control.  
 
However, the results of these simulations contrast sharply with the financial performance of 
the BPS in recent years. Between 1998 and 2002 (which is the last year for which we have 
data now), the financial assistance as a percentage of GDP grew significantly more than 
expected according to our simulations (table A1). The main discrepancy is on the 
expenditure side. The total expenditure of the BPS as a percentage of GDP grew 0.8 points 
between 1998 and 2002, while according to our simulations in the base scenario it should 
have decreased 0.8 points. The deep depression the Uruguayan economy passed through 
explains this discrepancy (table A2). The expenditure-GDP ratio grew despite of the 
reduction of the number of pensioners and of the real expenditure per pensioner, because 
total real GDP fell 17.5 per cent between 1998 and 2002. In the base scenario, total GDP 
was assumed to grow about 7 per cent in the same period in which actual GDP fell 17.5 per 
cent. Our simulations are not meant to reproduce the short run economic cycles and, in 
particular, we did not simulate the depression. What the simulations with MISS should 
provide is a better understanding of the trends. Unfortunately, having fluctuations of the 




The sensitivity analysis did not show significant effects of the interest rates or the rate of 
growth of wages on the budget of the BPS in per cent of GDP. The interest rate had no 
impact on the budget of the BPS simply because the BPS does not pay interests, but it does 
impact on the budget of the government that assists the BPS. The rate of growth of wages 
did not significantly impact on the simulated budget of the BPS as a percentage of the 
GDP, because the expenditure and the resources of the institution and the GDP are scaled 
up and down with real wages. In order to assess this result, it is important to remind that 
these are long run simulations in which the real wage is assumed to evolve according to 
productivity. The impact of short run deviations of the real wages with respect to the 
productivity trend could be different. 
 
The ages of retirement do matter for the financial result of the BPS, according to our 
simulations. On average, each year of delay of retirement reduces the financial assistance 
required by the BPS in about 0.2 percentage points of GDP (average in the whole period of 
estimation 1996-2050). Raising the minimum age for retirement would have a smaller 
                                                 
22  See the appendix for a more detailed comparison between actual and simulated performance in this period.   21 
impact, because this requirement is not currently binding for many workers. These workers 
are not likely to modify their current retirement behaviour, unless the rise of minimum 
retirement ages is really large.
23 The financial assistance required by the BPS could be 
reduced in almost 0.25 percentage points of GDP if the minimum retirement age were risen 
to 63 years (the current minimum is 60), and in approximately 0.50 if it were risen to 65 
(both figures are averages of the period 1996-2050). 
 
Following previous analysts, we assumed in all save one scenarios that, by the mid nineties, 
the BPS substantially improved its ability and/or willingness to monitor that applicants for 
contributory pensions did actually fulfil the required conditions. This assumption proved 
crucial for the results. To assess the point, we simulated a scenario in which the institution 
continues granting new pensions to individuals who did not contribute; other assumptions 
are those of the base scenario. With this only change with respect to the base scenario, we 
got a completely different path for the BPS financial assistance. Rather than a decreasing 
trend, we got an increase in the required assistance, reaching in the pick more than 5 
percentage points of GDP. It is worth emphasizing that we only have indirect estimations of 
the size of this phenomenon on which, according to our simulations, much of the fate of the 
reformed system hinges.  
 
The stricter conditions to apply for contributory pensions, both in the norms and in practice, 
could also have some worrisome social consequences in the future. Some of the elderly that 
under the previous rules would have received a contributory pension might end up with no 
pension under the new conditions. Being the elderly usually a vulnerable group in terms of 
the risk of poverty, this consideration is worth being taken into account. Besides, from a 
fiscal point of view, there are contingent liabilities associated to it, since this group of the 
population will have to be attended one way or another.  
 
The incidence of poverty among the elderly is low today in Uruguay. Even if the situation 
deteriorated in the future as several observers fear, the amount of resources the government 
would need to attend the new demands could be moderate to low, according to our 
estimations, provided the government managed it efficiently. Expanding the Uruguayan 
non-contributory-old-age pension program to cover individuals aged 65 years or more and 
adding a substantial number of applicants derived from an assumed drastic 10 per cent drop 
in the number of recipients of the contributory pension program (because of more 
restrictive access conditions) would cost about 0.4 points of GDP.
24  
 
We adopted pretty conservative assumptions, so that our estimation of the fiscal impact of 
the program can basically be taken as an upper bound. A reduction in the stock of retirees 
                                                 
23  We have already warned in the body of this paper that the information we have to do these computations is 
partial and old, though. 
24 Neither this estimation of the cost of an increased program nor the expenditure reported by the BPS in the 
current one (table 9) include the costs of the administration of the program. Even though these programs are 
usually administratively expensive, it does not mean that the estimated fiscal cost should change in terms of 
orders of magnitude. Of course, these costs should be computed in any specific project to reform the non-
contributory-old-age program, but this study is not such a project. It is rather meant to be a preliminary 
exploration of the available options.    22 
as large as 10 per cent is highly unlikely. It seems realistic to assume that workers who 
could become non-eligible for contributory pensions are poor, but we took this assumption 
to the extreme: we picked the poorest to conform the set of quitters, so that the number of 
new applicants for the non-contributory program was maximized. We were also very 
conservative in doing the estimation based on the household survey of 2002. This was one 
of the worst years of Uruguay in a long period. GDP dropped by almost 11 per cent that 
year, unemployment rose to almost 17 per cent, and, above all, the rate of poverty reached 
the maximum value of the decade (more than 8 percentage points over the minimum of the 
decade). In normal years, the estimated number of eligible candidates and the amount of 
pensions to pay should be lower.  
 
There is however one aspect in which the previous estimation is not conservative: we 
assumed that the public administration is able to determine current income of candidates 
accurately or, alternatively, that candidates report their earnings truthfully. Both 
assumptions are pretty optimistic. There are of course significant incentives to lie in this 
type of programs and it is not clear how well can the administration avoid being cheated. 
For this and related reasons mentioned above, we estimated the fiscal cost of a universal 
flat pension. Giving the current non-contributory-old-age pension to all individuals aged 65 
and above would cost about four per cent of GDP, which means approximately twenty 
times the expenditure of the current program.  
 
The estimated large cost of a universal flat pension, on one hand, and the technical and 
political challenges involved in the implementation of an expanded means-tested pension, 
on the other, face the government with a policy dilemma. One option is to try with a 
universal program, but with benefits significantly smaller than the current non-
contributory-old age pension. Another option is to insist with means testing, but rather than 
just expanding the current program, it seems wiser to consider first whether it is possible to 
strengthen the program to reduce the existing gap between what the legal norms say and 
what the administration seems to be able to do. Our study was too macro to provide the 
details, but it suggests that the following points could at least be analysed. First, the 
eligibility conditions should probably be simplified. The current ones look too complicated 
to implement and monitor, particularly in what refer to the earnings of direct relatives of the 
potential recipients. Second, the ability of the administrator of the program to control 
earnings should be carefully and realistically assessed, detecting the weak points and trying 
to improve on them. The evidence analysed in this paper suggests that the current 
capabilities of the BPS are not matching the very high administrative standards required to 
accurately implement the existing norms. Finally, in the fashion of the Chilean PASIS or 
the Costa Rican RNC, the assistance program could have an explicit ceiling on total 
expenditure and give the benefits to those applicants with better ratings until the available 
resources are spent or the number of eligible candidates becomes zero. Our computations 
show that, if the resources were efficiently managed, a pretty small program should be 
sufficient to get all the elderly needy out of poverty. This information could help to hold 
managers accountable: the number of eligible candidates in the waiting queue would be a 
simple measure of the efficiency and efficacy of the program. This would probably put 
significant pressure on the managers of the program.   23 
6 Appendix 
 
6.1  Simulated and observed budget of the BPS between 1995 and 
2002 
 
As it should be expected, there are significant discrepancies between the simulated and the 
observed paths of the budget of the BPS in recent years, mostly due to the economic cycle. 
In tables A1 and A2 we provide some information to compare the results of simulating the 
base scenario with the model MISS and the official statistics from the BPS and the BCU.  
 
In the aftermath of the reform, the resources collected by the BPS in per cent of GDP 
decreased less than expected according to the simulation. At the pick of the recent 
economic cycle, the own resources of the BPS according to the official statistics surpassed 
the results of the simulation in one percentage point of GDP. By the end of this period, both 
series almost overlapped. In the years of the boom, the rise of real wages pushed 
contributions up and the rise of GDP fostered the revenues from the value added tax, part of 
which is computed as own resources of the BPS.  
 
On the expenditure side, and according to the official statistics, the BPS has continued 
raising its spending as a percentage of GDP, at least until 2001. This ratio should have 
declined according to the model MISS, at least in the base scenario. In order to explain the 
sources of the discrepancy, we decomposed the BPS expenditure-GDP ratio (G/GDP) in 
three components, i.e. the number of pensioners (N), the real expenditure per pensioner (g) 
and the real product (gdp): 
25  gdp g N GDP G * = . 
 
As table A2 shows, there are differences between simulated and observed paths in the three 
components. The number of pensioners informed by the BPS continued growing at the 
inception of the reform, particularly until 1998, contradicting the simulated path. In the 
following years, the number of pensioners began to fall, and it did so at a greater pace than 
the simulated series. Nevertheless, in 2002 the number of pensioners registered in the BPS 
was approximately 4 per cent larger than the simulated figure in the base scenario. One 
possible explanation of this observed path is that the initial uncertainty with the reform 
induced some workers to retire earlier (table 1). Unfortunately, we do not have more 
detailed information to test this hypothesis formally.  
 
The expenditure per pensioner is smaller in the observed than in the simulated series in 
2002, but the situation was the opposite in the previous years. Between 1995 and 2000, the 
real expenditure per pensioner grew 16 per cent, just to lose it in the following two years. 
This path resembles that of real wages, but it is even more pronounced. The simulated 
                                                 
25 Notice that g results from dividing nominal per capita expenditure of the BPS by the implicit deflator of 
GDP (and not by CPI). This is just one of many possible decompositions of the expenditure-GDP ratio and it 
is a highly stylised one. It does not reflect the complexity of the institution, but we think it does provide some 
useful clues to understand the discrepancies between the simulations and the actual performance during the 
recent economic cycle. A more detailed analysis of this point is well beyond the scope of this paper.   24 
series is more paused, presenting an annual rate of growth of 0.9 per cent in this period. It is 
basically driven by the assumed rate of growth of productivity and wages, and the gradual 
substitution of pensioners of the old regime by pensioners ruled by the new norms.  
 
The third and last component in our decomposition of the expenditure-GDP ratio is the 
GDP itself. According to the BCU, the Uruguayan GDP was 4 per cent smaller in 2002 
than in 1995. The simulated series grew 17 per cent in the same period, mostly due to the 
assumed growth in the labour force and in productivity. During the first years of this 
period, however, the observed GDP grew significantly faster than the simulated GDP.  
 
We conclude that the discrepancies between the simulated and the observed expenditure-
GDP ratios during the first seven years of the reformed system were mostly determined by 
a pronounced macroeconomic cycle that the MISS model is not meant to capture. The ratio 
did not fall in the actual series as it did in the simulated one mostly because of the 
economic recession that reduced the denominator. During the first years, the unexpected 
and still not fully understood rose in the number of pensioners and the significant growth in 
real pensions played an important role as well. The strong expansion that the economic 
activity seems to have been experiencing in recent months and the forecast of a fast 
recovery during 2004 should drive the simulated and measured BPS expenditure-GDP 
ratios closer. Nevertheless, the unexpected path of the number of pensioners should be 
further scrutinized. 
 
6.2  Reforms of the non-contributory pensions 
 
6.2.1  Replicating the current old-age-non-contributory pension 
program  
 
The information provided by INE aggregates old-age-non-contributory and survival 
pensions. Therefore, in order to obtain a primary assessment of the expenditure involved by 
the old-age-non-contributory pension scheme, we resorted to the following methodology. 
 
The old-age-non-contributory pension is a supplementary income paid to people aged 70 or 
more whose individual incomes are below a certain threshold  pv and do not receive an 
alimony from their relatives (see box 2 for the details). For this estimation, we focused only 
on the individual earnings of the elderly, because we did not have reliable information on 
the alimonies. The implicit assumption is that all candidates in the age group with income 
below the threshold are in fact eligible. Individual incomes comprise both pension incomes 
and “other” incomes:  i i i o p y + = . In addition to this, pension incomes reported in the ECH 
(p) may include both survival ( ps) and non contributory ( pv) pensions:  i i i pv ps p + = . 
Hence, we can divide the population aged 70 or more into three groups based on their 
individual incomes:  
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1.  People whose incomes are higher than  pv. These people are not entitled to non-
contributory pensions. Therefore, pensions received by them should comprise 
only contributory pensions:  ps p =  and  0 = pv . 
2. People whose incomes are equal to  pv. These people may be receiving 
contributory as well as non-contributory pensions. The only thing we know 
about old-age non-contributory pension in this case is that  p pv ≤ ≤ 0 . 
3.  People whose incomes are less than  pv.  These people are not currently 
receiving old-age assistance pension; otherwise, their income would be equal to 
pv. Thus,  ps p =  and  0 = pv . 
 
Hence, the group of individuals receiving the non-contributory-old-age pension must 
satisfy the following criterion:  { } pv y age i I i i = ≥ = , 70 . In practice, the set of individuals 
in the survey aged 70 or more and earning exactly  pvis almost empty, because of 
measurement errors. If the survey measured earnings with no error, the number of 
individuals earning exactly  pv could not be lower than the number of receivers of the non-
contributory-old-age pension according to the BPS (keeping the assumption that reports are 
correct). But because of measurement errors, the set I must be defined with an interval of 
earnings. Let  i y'  be the observed earnings according to the ECH. The measurement error 
for total earnings is  i i i y y − = ' ε . Assuming errors are normally distributed with zero mean, 
we can build confidence intervals of wide  µ 2 , and redefine the set of eligible candidates 
as:  { } µ µ + ≤ ≤ − ≥ = v p y v p age i I i i , 70 . 
 
If  i i pv p = for all the individuals in I, then the sum of these individual pensions should be 
equal to total expenditure of the BPS in non-contributory-old-age pensions. But we cannot 
be sure of that. Let  [] 1 , 0 ∈ i a  be the ratio between the non-contributory pension and the total 
pension received by individual i:  i i i p pv a = . As discussed above,  0 = i a for people 
belonging to the first and the third group. However, we do not know the value of  i a  for 
people belonging to group 2. We made then the following two assumptions:  
 
Assumption 1: the mean relative error of the values of contributory and non-contributory 
pensions reported in the ECH is the same. Formally:    i i i i i i s ps ps v pv pv ε ε + = + =
' ' ,,  
where variables with tilde refer to measurements obtained by the ECH and variables 
without tilde refer to “true” values.  This assumption implies that: 
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ = =
i i i i i i i i ps s pv v ε ε ε %.  
 
We have aggregated information provided by the BPS about total expenditure in old-age 
non-contributory pensions (pvBPS), in disablement pensions and in contributory old-age 
pensions (psBPS). Based on this information, we can write: 























































































There is no information about expenditures of BPS in non-contributory pensions to allow 
us to separate those beneficiaries aged 70 or older from the rest of the population. Due to 
that, we considered for the right hand side of the former equation the whole population, 
bearing in mind that  0 = i a  for all individuals who are aged less than 70. 
 
Assumption 2: ai= a  is the same for all i belonging to the second group, and ai=0 for all 
those who do not belong to that group.  
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The next step was to estimate the value of a. For this purpose, we considered three 
alternative values for the amplitude of the interval of confidence:  500 = µ (estimation 1), 
425 = µ (estimation 2) and  350 = µ (estimation 3). The old-age assistance pension ( pv) for 
the year 2002 amounts to $1.947. The ratio between the expenditure of the BPS in non-
contributory-old-age and survival pensions is about 0.07  () () 07 , 0 ≅ psBPS pvBPS . The 
results are summarized in the following table: 
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Table A3: The estimation of the auxiliary coefficient a 
 
  Estimation 1  Estimation 2  Estimation 3 
Earnings range ($ per month)  1447 to 2447  1522 to 2372  1597 to 2297 
∑ ∈ I i i p (Millions of $ per month)  35 33  31 
∑ ∉ I i i p (Millions of $ per month)  464 466  468 
Coefficient a 0.93  0.97  1.00 
 
When we consider a = 1 (estimation 3), we are assuming that people aged 70 or older 
whose incomes are higher than $1597 and less than  $2297 do not receive any other pension 
than old-age assistance pension, so the value they declare in the ECH questionnaire 
corresponds exactly to the assistance program. In that sense, a=1 determines the minimum 
range of income given BPS information. If we extend the range of income variation 
considered admissible to perceive old-age assistance pensions, then the proportion of such 
pension in the total pension income decreases, though not significantly (if we move from 
350 = µ  to  500 = µ , “a” goes from 1.00 to 0.93). 
 
Once achieved the previous results, we proceed to calculate the assistance program 
expenditure for each one of the estimations proposed. The procedure involves applying the 
a values to the second group (people aged 70 or older whose incomes are around the actual 
value of old-age pension) and extract, by this means, the amount of old-age pension they 
should receive. We estimated in each case the number of recipients and total expenditure of 
the BPS in the program. The results attained are detailed in table A4. 
 
Table A4: Beneficiaries and expenditure in assistance pensions computed from the ECH. 
 
  Estimation 1  Estimation 2  Estimation 3 
Number of beneficiaries  18917  17892  16748 
Annual expenditure (millions of dollars)  18.4  18.3  18.0 
 
The overall estimated expenditure of about 18 million dollars is lower than the BPS's 
estimation (U$S 22 million). Nevertheless, our figure represents an important part of BPS's 
estimation, and is in accordance with the ratio between old age (non contributory) pensions 
and survival (contributory) pensions reported by BPS. Hence, the set I seems to be a 
reasonable sample of the population receiving old-age pension payments nowadays. 
Finally, it should be noted that the results attained in each estimation do not differ 
substantially, both regarding the expenditure under the program and the number of 
beneficiaries. In other words, the results are rather insensitive to the arbitrary assumptions 
concerning the range of values () µ considered to select the population of beneficiaries.  
6.2.2  Characteristics of people currently excluded from old – age non 
contributory scheme 
 
In addition to estimating the number of beneficiaries and total expenditure under the current 
old – age non-contributory pension scheme, we calculated the number of people who are   28 
being kept out of the program despite the fact that they are aged 70 or older and their 
individual incomes are less than the value of the pension.  
 
Table A5: Characteristics of individuals aged 70 and above who do not receive the 
assistance pension despite of earning less than the target pension 
 
  Estimation 1 Estimation 2 Estimation 3 
Number of people  21089  22274  22422 
% of people receiving financial support from 
other members of the household   2.9 3.3  3.5 
% of people whose household's per capita income 
is less than $ 2.000  13.9 13.3  13.5 
% of people whose household's per capita income 
is less than $ 2.500  22.3 22.4  22.7 
% of people who receive no income at all  60.4  57.2  52.8 
% of men  10.2  11.2  11.3 
% of women  89.8  88.8  88.7 
% of people between 70 and 75 years old  69.2  68.2  68.2 
 
This information suggests that most of these people are not currently receiving old-age-
non-contributory pensions because they live in households with relatively high incomes and 
are therefore not legally eligible for this program. What is more, if we take into account 
those relatives who do not share the same house with the elderly person but can nonetheless 
afford to pay him/her alimony, this figure would probably rise. Unfortunately, as it was 
already mentioned, it is not possible to do so based on the information provided by the 
Uruguayan Household Survey.  
 
6.2.3  Implementing in Uruguay the programs of Chile and Costa Rica 
 
We simulated the effects of the implementation in Uruguay of old – age non-contributory 
programmes resembling the ones existing in Chile and Costa Rica.  
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Table A6: Same data from assistance programs in Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay 
 
  Uruguay Chile  Costa  Rica 
GDP (millions of U$S, 2002)  12300  66425 15155 
Population (millions, 2002)  3.4  15.6  4.2 
Monthly per capita GDP (US$, 
2002)  303 355 300 
Non contributory pension  
(US$, 2002)  91 53 38 
Non contributory pension (in % 
of per capita GDP)  30 15 13 
Minimum age (years)   70  65  65 
Minimum contributory pension  
(US$, 2002)  122 117 102 
Minimum contributory pension 
(in  % of per capita GDP)  40 32 34 
 
In order to estimate total expenditure under both programmes, we computed the amount of 
individual benefits and afterwards multiply it by the number of beneficiaries. Individual 
benefits were calculated multiplying the ratio between assistance pension and per capita 
GDP in Chile and Costa Rica to per capita GDP in Uruguay.  
 
On the other hand, the number of potential beneficiaries was estimated in accordance with 
the accession requirements imposed by each of these programmes. In Chile, potential 
beneficiaries of non contributory old – age pensions are those people aged 65 or older who 
are currently earning less than 50% of the minimum contributory pension, are not entitled 
to any other pension or allowance (or else they should choose between them
26) and whose 
household's per capita income lies below that threshold. In Costa Rica, potential 
beneficiaries are those people aged 65 or older who are currently earning less than  50% of 
the minimum contributory pension and receive no contributory pensions. 
 
We used data from the 2002 Uruguayan Household Survey to simulate the effects of the 
implementation of the Chilean and Costa Rican programme in Uruguay. As already 
mentioned, we assumed that all candidates fulfilling the prerequisites were granted 
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Table 1: Percentage of population covered by the social protection system by age groups 
a 
 
55 to 59 years old  60 to 64 years old  65 or more years old 
Year 
Beneficiaries Contributors Population 
covered  Beneficiaries Contributors Population 
covered  Beneficiaries Contributors Population 
covered 
1991  32.1  33.4 65.5 58.0  17.5 75.5 88.3  2.8  91.1 
1992  31.7  32.7 64.4 57.1  18.2 75.3 88.5  3.0  91.5 
1993  31.5  33.6 65.1 58.0  16.6 74.6 88.5  2.5  91.0 
1994  29.2  33.5 62.7 58.4  16.2 74.6 88.3  2.6  90.9 
1995  29.5  34.5 64.0 56.8  18.1 74.9 87.7  3.2  90.9 
1996  31.0  33.5 64.5 57.5  16.7 74.2 87.8  3.0  90.8 
1997  30.6  32.7 63.3 56.8  15.8 72.6 88.1  2.8  90.9 
1998  29.8  35.8 65.6 55.1  16.2 71.3 87.6  2.7  90.3 
1999  28.9  35.6 64.5 54.3  17.0 71.3 87.4  2.8  90.2 
2000  27.9  35.8 63.7 55.1  19.1 74.2 86.9  3.1  90.0 
2001  25.7  38.4 64.1 52.6  18.7 71.3 85.9  3.2  89.1 
2002  23.3  38.7 62.0 50.7  20.3 71.0 87.1  3.3  90.4 
 
It includes all those who are covered by the contributory system and those who receive an assistential pension by the concept of 
disablement or old age. 
 
Note: The percentage of contributors is a proxy variable because the household survey does not allow for a direct estimation of it for most of the 
period. The methodology for building the proxy was taken from Bucheli (2003). 
 
Source: own computation based on ECH (INE).   33 
Table 2: Percentage of poor people by age groups. 
 
Year  Poor 
People 
Younger than 6 
years old 
From 6 to 12 
years old 
From 13 to 17 
years old 
From 18 to 64 
years old 
Older than 64 
years old 
1986 46.2  68.3  69.4  63.7  47.0  40.6 
1987 35.6  57.1  56.6  50.5  33.7  26.5 






1989 26.6  49.0  49.0  43.7  26.9  19.0 
1990 29.7  57.8  54.1  49.4  31.8  24.3 
1991 23.4  46.5  45.1  39.0  24.3  15.4 
1992 19.9  41.7  39.4  34.1  21.6  12.7 
1993 17.1  36.0  34.4  30.5  16.0  7.1 
1994 15.3  32.8  31.2  25.7  13.5  5.4 
1995 17.4  36.5  34.8  27.8  15.6  6.1 
1996 17.2  37.4  33.5  27.1  14.8  5.4 
1997 17.2  37.4  31.8  26.8  14.8  5.1 
1998 16.7  34.7  29.2  26.7  13.1  4.1 
1999 15.3  32.5  28.3  22.7  12.1  3.4 
2000 17.8  37.4  32.2  25.8  14.5  3.9 
2001 18.8  38.3  35.4  27.7  15.3  3.9 
2002 23.7  46.6  41.9  34.6  20.3  5.4 
 
  na = not available 
 
Note: The ECH has two methodological changes during this period: the first was in 1991, and the 
following in 2001. 
 
Source: own computation based on ECH (INE).   34 





c GDP  growth 
d 
1990 100.0  100.0  104.1  0.20 
1991 114.1  103.8  102.0  3.61 
1992 129.1  106.1  68.5  7.96 
1993 131.5  111.2  54.1  2.62 
1994 136.7  112.2  44.7  7.30 
1995 134.8  109.0  42.2  -1.45 
1996 136.7  109.7  28.3  5.58 
1997 137.3  109.9  19.8  5.04 
1998 140.7  111.9  10.8  4.55 
1999 145.5  113.7  5.7  -2.85 
2000 143.3  112.2  4.8  -1.44 
2001 141.3  111.9  4.4  -3.39 
2002 133.0  99.9  14.0  -10.76 
 
Elaborated on the basis of BPS data. It refers to the evolution of the amount of 
contributory pensions paid annually. 
Based on the real mean salary index elaborated by INE. 
Mean annual inflation. 
Real GDP growth rate. 
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Table 4: Social expenditure in pensions by institution  
(in percentage of GDP) 
 








1990 9.2  0.8  0.5  10.4 
1991 10.2  0.7  0.4  11.3 
1992 11.0  0.8  0.4  12.2 
1993 11.9  1.2  0.6  13.7 
1994 11.7  1.0  0.6  13.3 
1995 12.2  1.1  0.6  14.0 
1996 12.2  1.1  0.6  13.9 
1997 12.0  1.1  0.6  13.8 
1998 12.1  1.2  0.6  13.8 
1999 13.1  1.2  0.6  15.0 
2000 13.3  1.2  0.7  15.2 
2001 13.4  1.3  0.7  15.3 
2002 12.7  1.2  0.6  14.5 
 
a/  Expenditure due to health insurance (DISSE) and medical services due to domestic 
assignment are not included. Both are considered health expenditure. 
 




Table 5: The budget of the BPS by source 
(in percentage of the GDP) 
 
Year  Financial 
assistance  Expenditure   Own 
resources    
1990  0.8 10.0  9.2 
1991  1.4 11.6 10.2 
1992  1.5 12.5 11.0 
1993  2.2 12.9 10.7 
1994  2.6 13.5 10.9 
1995 3.1 13.8  10.6 
1996 3.4 13.8  10.3 
1997 3.6 13.7  10.2 
1998 3.5 13.8  10.3 
1999 4.2 15.0  10.8 
2000 4.5 15.0  10.5 
2001 4.6 15.0  10.5 
2002 4.8 14.7  9.9 
 
Source: own computations with data from BPS and BCU.  37 
Table 6: Description of the Simulated Scenarios 
 
   1 2 3 4 5 6 7  8  9 10  11  12 
Real interest rate (annual)  3.8  2.8 4.8 3.8  3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.8  3.8 3.8 
Real wage (annual rate of growth)  1.1  1.1  1.1  0.4 1.8 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1 1.1  1.1 1.1 
Minimum  age  for  retirement  60 60 60 60 60 60 60  63 65 60 60 60 
Rates of replacement  a/  a/  a/  a/  a/  a/  a/  a/  a/  b/ c/ a/ 
Labor history of males                                    
   Actual working ages  24 to 65 24 to 65 24 to 65 24 to 65 24 to 65 24 to 66 24 to 67 24 to 66 24 to 67 24 to 65 24 to 65 24 to 65 
   Declared working ages  29 to 63 29 to 63 29 to 63 29 to 63 29 to 63 29 to 64 29 to 65 29 to 64 29 to 65 29 to 63 29 to 63 29 to 63 
   Age when the pension is granted  64  64  64  64  64  65 66 65 66 64 64 64 
Labor history of females                                    
   Actual working ages  24 to 59 24 to 59 24 to 59 24 to 59 24 to 59 24 to 60 24 to 61 24 to 63 24 to 64 24 to 59 24 to 59 24 to 59 
   Declared working ages  24 to 58 24 to 58 24 to 58 24 to 58 24 to 58 24 to 59 24 to 60 24 to 62 24 to 63 24 to 58 24 to 58 24 to 58 
   Age when the pension is granted  60  60  60  60  60  61 62 64 65 60 60 60 
Benefits recieved by non-contributors                                    
   Assistance old-age pension  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  No 
   Contributory pension  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  No  Yes 
 
a/ Rates of replacement according to law 16.713. The minimum is 50 and the maximum is 82.5 percent. In the middle, the rate of replacement is 
an increasing function of the age of retirement and the years of effective contributions. 
b/ In this scenario, the rates of replacement are two percentage points lower than in the base scenario. 
c/ In this scenario, the rates of replacement are four percentage points lower than in the base scenario. 
 
Source: own computations.   38 
Table 7: The budget of the BPS by source in the base scenario  
(as a percentage of GDP). 
 
Year Assistance  Expenditure Own 
resources 
1995 3.13 13.78  10.65 
1996 3.77 13.79  10.03 
1997 3.70 13.67  9.96 
1998 3.64 13.54  9.90 
1999 3.58 13.41  9.84 
2000 3.52 13.29  9.77 
2001 3.09 12.96  9.87 
2002 2.96 12.76  9.81 
2003 3.29 13.05  9.76 
2004 3.16 12.86  9.69 
2005 3.03 12.67  9.63 
2006 2.91 12.48  9.57 
2007 2.79 12.31  9.52 
2008 2.68 12.14  9.46 
2009 2.56 11.98  9.42 
2010 2.59 11.96  9.38 
2011 2.43 11.76  9.33 
2012 2.28 11.57  9.29 
2013 2.14 11.38  9.24 
2014 2.08 11.30  9.22 
2015 2.02 11.21  9.19 
2016 1.95 11.13  9.17 
2017 1.88 11.04  9.16 
2018 1.81 10.95  9.14 
2019 1.72 10.85  9.13 
2020 1.63 10.74  9.11 
2021 1.50 10.61  9.11 
2022 1.36 10.47  9.11 
2023 1.28 10.40  9.11 
2024 1.20 10.31  9.11 
2025 1.10 10.22  9.11 
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Table 7: The budget of the BPS by source in base scenario  
(as a percentage of GDP). (Continuation) 
 
Year Assistance  Expenditure Own 
resources 
2026 1.01  10.12  9.11 
2027 0.94  10.06  9.12 
2028 0.87  9.99  9.12 
2029 0.80  9.91  9.12 
2030 0.72  9.84  9.12 
2031 0.64  9.76  9.12 
2032 0.90  10.03  9.13 
2033 0.82  9.95  9.13 
2034 0.75  9.88  9.13 
2035 0.69  9.83  9.13 
2036 0.64  9.78  9.13 
2037 0.60  9.73  9.13 
2038 0.55  9.69  9.13 
2039 0.52  9.65  9.13 
2040 0.49  9.62  9.13 
2041 0.47  9.60  9.13 
2042 0.45  9.58  9.13 
2043 0.44  9.57  9.13 
2044 0.43  9.57  9.14 
2045 0.43  9.57  9.14 
2046 0.43  9.57  9.14 
2047 0.44  9.57  9.14 
2048 0.56  9.71  9.15 
2049 0.57  9.71  9.15 
2050 0.57  9.72  9.15 
 
Note:   The figures in this table were computed with the 
MISS simulation model and do not reproduce the 
economic cycle. 
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Table 8: Government financial assistance to the BPS in different scenarios  (as a percentage of GDP) 
 
Year  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4  Scenario 5  Scenario 6  Scenario 7  Scenario 8  Scenario 9 Scenario 10 Scenario 11  Scenario 12 
a 
1995  3.13 3.13 3.13 3.13 3.13 3.11 3.10 3.11 3.10 3.13 3.13  3.13 
1996  3.77 3.78 3.76 3.76 3.78 3.71 3.64 3.63 3.57 3.77 3.77  3.78 
1997  3.70 3.72 3.69 3.70 3.71 3.60 3.49 3.50 3.40 3.70 3.70  3.89 
1998  3.64 3.65 3.63 3.64 3.65 3.50 3.35 3.37 3.23 3.64 3.64  4.01 
1999  3.58 3.59 3.57 3.57 3.59 3.41 3.21 3.25 3.07 3.58 3.58  4.11 
2000  3.52 3.53 3.51 3.51 3.53 3.31 3.08 3.13 2.91 3.52 3.52  4.22 
2001  3.09 3.11 3.07 3.08 3.10 3.05 2.76 2.82 2.56 3.09 3.09  3.96 
2002  2.96 2.97 2.94 2.95 2.97 2.89 2.63 2.69 2.40 2.96 2.96  4.00 
2003  3.29 3.31 3.28 3.28 3.31 3.21 2.96 3.03 2.74 3.29 3.29  4.51 
2004  3.16 3.18 3.15 3.15 3.18 3.05 2.78 2.90 2.58 3.16 3.16  4.54 
2005  3.03 3.05 3.02 3.02 3.05 2.90 2.61 2.74 2.43 3.03 3.03  4.58 
2006  2.91 2.93 2.89 2.89 2.93 2.74 2.43 2.58 2.25 2.89 2.88  4.62 
2007  2.79 2.81 2.78 2.78 2.81 2.61 2.29 2.44 2.10 2.76 2.73  4.68 
2008  2.68 2.70 2.66 2.66 2.70 2.47 2.11 2.30 1.92 2.63 2.59  4.73 
2009  2.56 2.58 2.54 2.54 2.58 2.31 1.94 2.13 1.75 2.50 2.44  4.78 
2010  2.59 2.61 2.57 2.57 2.61 2.32 1.97 2.16 1.78 2.51 2.44  4.97 
2011  2.43 2.45 2.41 2.41 2.45 2.15 1.79 2.00 1.61 2.34 2.26  4.97 
2012  2.28 2.30 2.27 2.26 2.31 1.99 1.63 1.86 1.46 2.18 2.08  4.99 
2013  2.14 2.16 2.12 2.11 2.16 1.83 1.46 1.71 1.32 2.01 1.90  5.01 
2014  2.08 2.10 2.06 2.06 2.10 1.83 1.46 1.72 1.31 1.94 1.82  4.99 
2015  2.02 2.05 2.00 2.00 2.05 1.77 1.46 1.66 1.30 1.87 1.73  4.98 
2016  1.95 1.97 1.93 1.93 1.98 1.71 1.41 1.59 1.24 1.79 1.63  4.95 
2017  1.88 1.91 1.87 1.86 1.91 1.64 1.34 1.52 1.18 1.70 1.53  4.93 
2018  1.81 1.83 1.79 1.79 1.84 1.55 1.26 1.45 1.11 1.62 1.45  4.90 
2019  1.72 1.74 1.70 1.70 1.75 1.46 1.17 1.38 1.04 1.53 1.34  4.84 
2020  1.63 1.65 1.61 1.60 1.65 1.37 1.09 1.30 0.97 1.43 1.24  4.79 
2021  1.50 1.52 1.48 1.47 1.52 1.27 0.99 1.21 0.90 1.29 1.10  4.72 
2022  1.36 1.39 1.34 1.34 1.39 1.13 0.90 1.09 0.81 1.15 0.96  4.62 
2023  1.28 1.31 1.26 1.26 1.31 1.06 0.84 1.03 0.76 1.07 0.87  4.54 
2024  1.20 1.22 1.18 1.17 1.22 0.98 0.77 0.96 0.71 0.98 0.77  4.47 
2025  1.10 1.13 1.09 1.08 1.13 0.90 0.70 0.89 0.64 0.89 0.67  4.38   41 
Table 8: Government financial assistance to the BPS in different scenarios  (as a percentage of GDP) 
(continuation) 
Year  Scenario 1  Scenario 2  Scenario 3  Scenario 4  Scenario 5  Scenario 6  Scenario 7  Scenario 8  Scenario 9  Scenario 12 
a 
2026  1.01 1.03 0.99 0.98 1.03 0.81 0.61 0.80 0.57  4.28 
2027  0.94 0.96 0.92 0.91 0.97 0.75 0.56 0.75 0.52  4.23 
2028  0.87 0.89 0.85 0.84 0.90 0.68 0.50 0.69 0.47  4.17 
2029  0.80 0.82 0.78 0.77 0.83 0.61 0.43 0.63 0.41  4.09 
2030  0.72 0.74 0.70 0.69 0.75 0.54 0.36 0.56 0.35  4.02 
2031  0.64 0.67 0.62 0.61 0.67 0.46 0.29 0.49 0.28  3.96 
2032  0.90 0.92 0.88 0.86 0.93 0.73 0.57 0.76 0.56  4.33 
2033  0.82 0.85 0.80 0.79 0.86 0.66 0.49 0.68 0.48  4.26 
2034  0.75 0.77 0.73 0.72 0.78 0.58 0.42 0.61 0.41  4.20 
2035  0.69 0.72 0.68 0.66 0.73 0.53 0.36 0.55 0.35  4.14 
2036  0.64 0.67 0.62 0.61 0.68 0.48 0.31 0.50 0.30  4.10 
2037  0.60 0.62 0.58 0.56 0.63 0.43 0.26 0.45 0.25  4.06 
2038  0.55 0.58 0.54 0.52 0.59 0.39 0.22 0.41 0.20  4.02 
2039  0.52 0.54 0.50 0.48 0.55 0.35 0.18 0.37 0.16  3.99 
2040  0.49 0.51 0.47 0.45 0.52 0.32 0.15 0.34 0.13  3.97 
2041  0.47 0.49 0.45 0.43 0.50 0.30 0.13 0.31 0.11  3.96 
2042  0.45 0.47 0.43 0.41 0.48 0.28 0.11 0.29 0.09  3.95 
2043  0.44 0.46 0.42 0.40 0.47 0.27 0.10 0.28 0.08  3.94 
2044  0.43 0.45 0.41 0.40 0.47 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.07  3.94 
2045  0.43 0.45 0.41 0.39 0.47 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.07  3.95 
2046  0.43 0.46 0.41 0.40 0.47 0.27 0.09 0.28 0.07  3.95 
2047  0.44 0.46 0.42 0.40 0.47 0.27 0.10 0.28 0.07  3.96 
2048  0.56 0.58 0.54 0.52 0.60 0.40 0.23 0.43 0.23  4.13 
2049  0.57 0.59 0.55 0.52 0.60 0.40 0.23 0.43 0.23  4.14 
2050  0.57 0.59 0.55 0.53 0.61 0.41 0.24 0.44 0.24  4.15 
             
  
Notes:   See table 6 for a description of the scenarios. The figures in this table were computed with the MISS simulation model and do not reproduce the economic cycle. 
  a/ These computations were taken from Caristo and Forteza (2003). 
Source: own computations.   42 
Table 9: The non-contributory-old-age pension program of BPS. 
 
   1990 1995 2000 2001 2002 
Number of old-age pensioners  29293 
a 21172  20443 18777 18126 
Pensions (in % of per capita GDP)                
   Target  23.9  29.4  31.7  31.8  30.2 
   Average  21.6  27.5  29.2  29.7  29.2 
Poverty line of INE (in % of per capita GDP)  38.3  31.0  28.6  29.2  34.6 
Expenditure of BPS in non-contributory-old-age pensions                
   In per cent of total BPS expenditure  1.99  1.39  1.29  1.20  1.15 
   In per cent of GDP  0.20  0.19  0.19  0.18  0.17 
 
  Value in December of 1990. For the rest of the series, values are annual means. 
 





Table 10: Non-contributory pension programs in Chile, Costa Rica and Uruguay 
(2002) 
 
   Uruguay Chile  Costa  Rica 
Pension          




Equal to the 
target pension 
Equal to the target 
pension 
Target pension (in US dollars per month)  91.4  53  38 
Target pension (in per cent of per capita GDP)  30.2  14.9  12.6 
Eligibility conditions          
Minimum age (in years)  70  65  65 
Maximum individual income (in US dollars)  91.4  57.5  51 
Maximum household per cápita income (in US 
dollars)  It does not apply  57.5  No restriction 
Minimum income for direct relatives to be legally 
mandated to provide an alimony  (in US dollars) 
104 to 156  It does not 
apply 
It does not apply 
Other requirements  No 







Source: own computations, based on information from the Uruguayan household survey 2002, BPS, PASIS 
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Table 11: Amount of pension, number of beneficiaries and total cost of implementing 






program in Uruguay 
A Costa Rica-like 
program in Uruguay 
Pension (in per cent of per capita GDP)  30.20  14.90  12.60 
Number of beneficiaries  18126  2174  33397 
Total cost of the program (in per cent of GDP)  0.17 0.01  0.14 
 












Table 12: Number of receipients and total cost of several alternatives to reform the 
assistance old-age program. 
 
   Number of 
beneficiaries 
Total cost of the program  
(in per cent of GDP)  b/ 
Current program  18126 0.17 
Proposals to reform      a/       
1. Reducing from 70 to 65 the minimun age       
   1.1. Assuming no reduction in coverage of 
the contributory programs 
28186 0.25 
   1.2. Assuming receipients of contributory 
pensions drop by 10% and all of them apply 
and are eligible for non-contributory pensions. 
39043 0.37 
2. Lump sum universal pension       
   2.1. Pension equal to minimum salary     439251  2.30 
   2.2. Maintaining current old-age pension  439251  3.90 
 
Notes:  
a/ The details of each option are explained in the text. 
b/ Based on 2002 figures. 
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Table A1: The budget of the BPS in per cent of GDP.  
Official statistics and series simulated with MISS. 
 
Financial assistance  Expenditure      Own resources    
Año 
BPS-BCU MISS BPS-BCU MISS  BPS-BCU  MISS 
1995 3.1 3.1  13.8  13.8 10.6  10.7 
1996  3.4 3.8  13.8  13.8 10.3  10.0 
1997  3.6 3.7  13.7  13.7 10.2  10.0 
1998  3.5 3.6  13.8  13.5 10.3 9.9 
1999  4.2 3.6  15.0  13.4 10.8 9.8 
2000  4.5 3.5  15.0  13.3 10.5 9.8 
2001  4.6 3.1  15.0  13.0 10.5 9.9 
2002  4.8 3.0  14.7  12.8  9.9 9.8 
 
Notes: The simulated figures are for the base scenario (scenario 1 in table 1). 
 
Sources: Computed with data from BCU and BPS. 
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Table A2: Expenditure of the BPS, number of pensioners and GDP.  
Official statistics and series simulated with MISS. 
 
Expenditure of the BPS  Number of pensioners  Real expen. per pensioner   Real GDP 
(per cent of GDP)  (thousands)  (thousands of pesos 1995)  (thousands of millions of pesos 1995)  Año 
BPS-BCU MISS  BPS  MISS  BPS  MISS  BCU  MISS 
1995 13.8 13.8  352  352  48  48  123  123 
1996 13.8 13.8  356  353  50  49  129  125 
1997 13.7 13.7  367  353  51  49  136  127 
1998 13.8 13.5  373  354  53  49  142  129 
1999 15.0 13.4  371  354  56  50  138  131 
2000 15.0 13.3  367  354  56  50  136  134 
2001 15.0 13.0  363  345  54  51  131  136 
2002 14.7 12.8  360  346  48  51  117  138 
                          
Annual rate of growth 1995-
2002 (in %)  0.3 -0.3  0.0  0.9  -0.6  1.7 
 
Notes: The simulated figures are for the base scenario (scenario 1 in table 6). 
 
Sources: Computed with data from BCU and BPS.   46 
Figure 1: The budget of the BPS. Base Scenario.































































































































Real interest rate = 3.8% 
Rate of growth of real wages = 1.1% 
Average age for retirement: female 60, male 64. 
 
Source: Own computations.   47 
Figure 2: Deficit of the BPS with several average retirement ages 






































Female 60, Male 64
Female 61, Male 65




Real interest rate = 3.8% 
Rate of growth of real wages = 1.1% 
 
Source: Own computations.   48 
Figure 3: Deficit of the BPS with several minimum retirement ages













































Real interest rate = 3.8% 
Rate of growth of real wages = 1.1% 
 
Source: Own computations. 
 